We present a novel phase-based encoding scheme for measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD). This protocol uses single photons in a linear superposition of three orthogonal states, for generating the key. These orthogonal states correspond to the three distinct paths in delay line interferometers used by two (trusted) sources. The key information is decoded by an untrusted third party Charles, who uses a beamsplitter to measure the phase difference between pulses traveling through different paths of the two delay lines. The proposed scheme combines the best of both differential-phase-shift (DPS) QKD and MDI-QKD. It is more robust to phase fluctuations, and also ensures protection against detector side-channel attacks. We obtain the secure key rate for our protocol and show that it compares well to existing protocols in the asymptotic regime. We also prove unconditionally security by demonstrating an equivalent protocol involving shared entanglement between the two trusted parties. Finally, we bridge the gap between theory and practice by quantifying the performance of the proposed protocol in the finite-key regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is proven to be unconditionally secure in theory [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . However, QKD protocols maybe rendered insecure in practice, because of the difference in the behavior of practical devices and their theoretical models used in security proofs. For example, the standard protocols and their security proofs fail to take into account side-channel attacks on the detectors [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , thereby compromising security.
Various solutions have been proposed to counteract side-channel attacks. One solution is to develop precise mathematical models of devices used in the QKD experiments and incorporate these models into new security proofs [15, 16] . However, the complex nature of devices makes this approach very challenging to realize in practice. The other solution is to develop counter measures against the known side-channel attacks [17, 18] , but the QKD system still remains vulnerable to unanticipated attacks. Device independent QKD (DI-QKD) [19, 20] is another viable candidate against side-channel attacks. The security of DI-QKD relies on the violations of Bell inequality. However, the requirement of loophole-free Bell test and an extremely low key rate at long distances makes this unfeasible with current technology [21, 22] . Measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) [23] was introduced as a practical solution to side-channel attacks on the measurement unit.
In an MDI-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob encode their respective classical key bits into quantum states and send it to a potentially untrusted party, Charles. It is assumed that the measurement unit is under complete control of Charles, who carries out the measurement and announces the results. This is followed by the usual steps of sifting, error correction and privacy amplification as carried out in standard QKD protocols. The first MDI-QKD scheme was designed for a polarization-based implementation of BB84 [23] . MDI protocols employing time-bin [24, 25] and phase-based encodings [26] [27] [28] [29] also exist in the literature -see [30] for a recent review. However, random phase and polarization fluctuations are a major hindrance in long distance implementations of polarization and phase-based MDI-QKD schemes.
Here, we propose a differential-phase-shift MDI-QKD (DPS MDI-QKD) scheme, as a potential candidate for alleviating random phase and polarization fluctuations. In a differential phase encoded QKD protocol, the classical key is encoded in the phase difference between successive pulses generated by a source thereby canceling the effects of phase and polarization fluctuations. There are a few variants of differential-phase-shift keying proposed in the literature [31] . For example, the sender Alice could use a phase modulator in combination with a random number generator to apply a random phase of either 0 or π, on a sequence of successive pulses generated by a weak coherent source [32] . Alternately, the phase modulation maybe done on a single photon pulse converted into a superposition of three orthogonal states corresponding to three different time-bins, via a delay line interferometer [33] .
Here, we make use of the 3-pulse protocol, whose security is based on the fact that the eavesdropper has to distinguish between a set of four non-orthogonal quantum states. While the coherent-state DPS protocol is provably secure against individual attacks [34] , the singlephoton based 3-pulse protocol is shown to be unconditionally secure [35] . However, this security proof assumes infinitely long keys whereas experimental implementations are constrained by the finite computational power of Alice and Bob, resulting in keys of finite length.
Finite-key analysis of QKD protocols has attracted a lot of attention in the past decade. Effect of the finiteness of the key size on security parameters was first studied in [36] . Security of BB84 [37] and decoy state protocols [38] [39] [40] against collective attacks in the finite-key regime has been established. Techniques used for finite-key analysis of conventional QKD have also been applied to MDI-QKD, for specific attacks [41] . More recently, a rigorous security proof of MDI-QKD against general attacks for a finite key length has been demonstrated [42] .
In this paper, we present a measurement-device-independent QKD scheme which incorporates the advantages of differential phase encoding. We show that our scheme offers better security in the asymptotic regime, and present a security proof in the finite-key regime as well. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II we briefly review the 3-pulse DPS-QKD protocol and its security aspects. We discuss our DPS-MDI protocol in Sec. III and obtain the secure key rate. We show that it maps to an entanglement-based protocol in Sec. IV A and finally present the finite-key analysis in Sec. IV.
FIG. 1:
Schematic of 3-pulse differential-phase-shift QKD.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Starting with the original proposal to implement the well known B92 protocol [43] , differential-phase or distributed-phase protocols have been well studied in the QKD literature [31] . Such protocols are popular because they are relatively easy to implement (compared to polarization-based protocols) and are more robust to phase and polarization fluctuations. While the majority of the phase-based schemes use weak coherent pulses for encoding the key, here we use the single-photon scheme proposed in [33] . We shall henceforth refer to this scheme as the 3-pulse DPS-QKD protocol and provide a brief description below.
A. 3-pulse differential-phase-shift keying
In a 3-pulse DPS-QKD protocol, the sender (Alice) throws a single photon into a superposition of three timebins, corresponding to the three distinct paths of a delay line interferometer, and then uses a phase modulator to introduce a relative phase between successive pulses in the 3-pulse train. See Fig. 1 for a schematic of the full set-up. Alice encodes her random key bit {0, 1} as a random phase {0, π} between successive pulses. The receiver (Bob) thus gets one of the four non-orthogonal quantum states given below, corresponding to the four possible phase-differences.
Here, |1 and |0 indicate the presence and absence of a photon respectively, in each of the paths labeled 1, 2, 3 in Fig. 1 . The photon has an equal probability of traversing each of the paths.
Bob's decoding setup comprises of an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) and two singlephoton detectors. The path lengths are chosen such that the longer arm of Bob's MZI introduces a time delay ∆t which is exactly equal to the time taken by the photon in traversing the difference in the lengths of the two successive arms of Alice's delay line interferometer. Thus, Bob can detect the incoming photon in one of the four possible time-instances, which we label as t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , which are separated by a time of ∆t. Detections at times t 1 and t 4 do not provide any phase information, whereas detections at times t 2 and t 3 provide information about the relative phases θ 12 and θ 23 respectively (see Fig. 1 ). Specifically, Bob decodes the key bit associated with a given time-slot as a 0 (1) if detector D0 (D1) clicks. By publicly announcing his detection times, Bob performs key-reconciliation with Alice and it is easy to see that the sifted key rate for this 3-pulse protocol is 1/2.
An alternate form of phase-encoded QKD is the pulsetrain DPS-QKD [32] , which is a variant of the original B92 protocol [43] . In the pulse-train protocol, Alice generates a train of coherent pulses and applies a phase of 0 or π to the pulses randomly, to encode key bits {0, 1} respectively. These phase modulated pulse trains are sent to Bob, who passes the incoming pulses through an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI). Depending upon the phase difference between two successive pulses, constructive or destructive interference happens. A measurement-device-independent QKD protocol based on the coherent-state pulse-train DPS protocol has been proposed recently [27] .
We refer to [44] for a detailed analysis of the secure key rate for the 3-pulse DPS protocol, assuming individual attacks. A simple comparison with the pulse-train DPS protocol [45] shows that the 3-pulse variant offers better security against individual attacks, in the following sense: the error rate introduced by an eavesdropper is typically higher, whereas the learning rate of the eavesdropper is typically lower for the 3-pulse protocol [44] .
Finally, we note that the 3-pulse DPS-QKD protocol can be extended to an n-pulse protocol by increasing the number of possible paths that the single photon can take at the sender's set-up. In fact, the single photon DPS protocol using n such paths has been shown to be unconditionally secure against general attacks for any n ≥ 3 [35] . However, while a larger n achieves a higher sifted key rate per emitted photon, it also results in a lower key rate per pulse; in fact, the n = 3 protocol is shown to achieve the optimal secure key rate per pulse [35] .
III. DPS-MDI-QKD
We now describe our measurement-device-independent QKD protocol based on the 3-pulse phase encoding scheme, using ideal single-photon sources. Apart from the fact that this scheme offers better security against individual attacks, compared to other DPS protocols, there are other practical considerations that motivate our use of the 3-path superposition in our protocol.
Firstly, the phase-independent nature of Hong-OuMandel interference [46] makes it difficult to design a pulse-train protocol for ideal single-photon sources. An MDI protocol based on a two-pulse superposition has been studied in the literature [28] . However, this would require four different phase values for encoding the information, resulting in a phase-encoded version of BB84. Using only two phase values (0 and π) makes the states in a two-pulse protocol orthogonal, making them perfectly distinguishable [35] . Hence, we need at least 3-paths in the superposition to implement an MDI protocol using only a pair of phases 0 and π for the encoding.
A simple schematic is shown in Fig. 2 . Alice and Bob generate single-photon pulses which are passed through their respective delay line interferometers. The splitting ratios of the beamsplitters (BSM) of the delay lines are selected such that every photon has an equal probability of traversing through each arm of the delay line. This ensures that Alice and Bob's single-photon pulses are transformed into linear superpositions of three orthogonal states, corresponding to the three paths of their respective delay line interferometers, as described in Eq. (1). Alice and Bob then encode their random key bits {0, 1} by assigning a relative phase difference of {0, π} between two successive pulses, using their phase modulators (PM). Finally, they send their encoded signal states to the measurement unit (Charles).
Charles' measurement set-up comprises of a beamsplitter and two single-photon detectors, labeled D c and D d as indicated in Fig. 2 . For every photon detected by his setup, he announces as to which detector clicked (D c or D d or both) and the corresponding time-instance (t 1 , t 2 or t 3 ) at which the click was observed. Based on this information, which is made public by Charles, Alice and Bob perform sifting and extract the sifted key. The sifting and reconciliation step is explained in detail in the following section.
A. Sifting and Reconciliation
We may use the form of the encoded 3-pulse state in Eq. (1) to represent the input to the Charles' measurement module as, 
As before, |1 and |0 indicate the presence or absence of a photon in a particular path, and the subscripts 1, 2, 3 label the different possible paths of Alice and Bob's delaylines respectively. Thus, |1
3 is the 3-pulse state corresponding to the photon traversing path 1 a in Alice's set-up, |0
3 is a 3-pulse state corresponding to photon traversing path 2 b in Bob's setup, and so on.
Corresponding to every pair of photons generated by the sources, there are three distinct time-instancest 1 , t 2 , t 3 -at which Charles' detectors click, corresponding to paths 1 a , 2 a , 3 a and 1 b , 2 b , 3 b in Alice and Bob's set-ups respectively. We first rewrite Charles' input state by grouping pairs of pulses that arrive at the same timeinstance:
Note that the pairs of photons that traverse through identical paths in Alice and Bob's interferometer (such as (1 a , 1 b ) or (2 a , 2 b ) or (3 a , 3 b )) do not contribute to the sifted key. Such a pair of photons would bunch together due to Hong-Ou-Mandel interference [46] and come out of the same port of the beamsplitter. Further, recall that the action of the beamsplitter with input ports a, b and output ports c, d, when there's a photon incident on only one of the two ports is given by,
.
Using this, we can write down the final two-photon state after the action of Charles' beamsplitter. We refer to Appendix A for the details of the calculation. From the form of the final state in Eq. (A5), we observe that depending on the values of the relative phases ∆φ 1 = φ a1 − φ b1 and ∆φ 2 = φ a2 − φ b2 , Charles may have the same or different detectors click at two different timeinstances.
Finally, Alice and Bob perform key reconciliation once Charles announces his measurement outcomes. Based on which detector (D c or D c ) clicks and the time-instances (t 1 , t 2 and t 3 ) corresponding to the clicks for each pair of signal states, Alice and Bob can generate the sifted key using either ∆φ 1 or ∆φ 2 as described in Table I .
It follows immediately that the the sifted key rate of our protocol is,
Comparing Eqs. (3) and (A1), we see that one-third of the incoming photons have to be discarded due to HongOu-Mandel interference. This leads to the first factor of . Next, we observe from the key reconciliation table that two-thirds of Charles' measurements contribute to the raw key, thus leading to a sifted key rate of 4 9 . We note that the MDI protocol based on the 3-pulse encoding offers a lower key rate compared to the one based on the coherent-state pulse-train DPS encoding [27] .
B. Asymptotic Secure Key Rate
Alice and Bob perform classical post-processing on the sifted key to extract the final secure key from it. The first step of this post-processing is the estimation of the error rate in the sifted key, which involves Alice and Bob exposing a fraction of their sifted key bits in order to calculate the error rate. They abort the protocol and start again from the beginning (i.e signal transmission to Charles) if their calculated error rate exceeds a predefined threshold. They define this threshold error rate by taking into account the error introduced in the key, both due to system imperfections as well as any potential eavesdropping.
When the estimated error rate lies below the threshold error rate, they carry out the second step of postprocessing -error correction. Alice and Bob apply a suitable error correction scheme on their sifted key to correct all the erroneous bits. These error estimation and correction steps happen over a classical channel. We assume that the Eve has complete control over this classical channel and hence, is privy to all the information being transmitted over this public channel between Alice Det c clicks at t1 and det d at t2 Extract key using ∆φ1 Yes
Det c clicks at t2 and det d at t1 Extract key using ∆φ1 Yes
Det c clicks at t1 and det d at t3 Extract key using ∆φ2 Yes
Det c clicks at t3 and det d at t1 Extract key using ∆φ2 Yes
Det c clicks at t2 and det d at t3 Discard the bits -
Det c clicks at t3 and det d at t2
Discard the bits -and Bob. Therefore, the final step of this classical postprocessing is privacy amplification, which aims to reduce Eve's knowledge about the key well below an acceptable level. This is done by discarding a fraction of the errorfree key. Alice and Bob typically use a hash function to carry out privacy amplification. Using the sifted key rate obtained in Eq. (5) and following the standard analysis in [4] , we obtain the following asymptotic secure key rate, for our MDI-DPS protocol.
Here, R prac sift is the practical sifted key generation rate (in bits/s) and f (e) represents the inefficiency of the error correction scheme employed by Alice and Bob. R prac sift depends upon the probability of clicking of Charle's detectors (p click ) and the repetition rate of the source (γ) as,
Charles detectors can click either due to the signal photons or due to the background noise. The detector clicks due to background noise are referred as dark count. Hence,
The probability of one of the detectors clicking due to the signal photons is proportional to the transmission efficiency of the channel. We assume that the channel connecting Alice to Charles and the one connecting Bob to Charles are identical in every aspect (length, characteristic loss etc.), and hence define the total transmission efficiency (T ) of the channel and Charles detection setup as,
Here, η is the quantum efficiency of the single-photon detector of the Charles. The error rate (e) is determined only by the dark count and the baseline error rate (b) of the system as shown below.
A factor of half comes into Eq. (10) as half of the dark counts lead to correct clicking of the detectors because of the random nature of these clicks.
To get a numerical estimate of the asymptotic key rate, we now evaluate R by taking the values of all the fixed parameters of the system from [45] . The detection efficiency of the single-photon detector is 10%, the loss co-efficient of channel is 0.2 dB/km and the baseline error rate is taken as 1%. p dark is taken as 2 × 10 −5 , γ is fixed at 10 MHz and f (e) assumes a value of 1.16. We can now plot the variation in key rate with the length of the channel between Alice and Bob, as shown in Fig. 3 .
Our plot compares the secure key rate obtained for our DPS-MDI-QKD with that obtained for 3-pulse DPS and the BB84 protocols. We see that the DPS-MDI protocol yields a non-zero secure key rate for much longer channel lengths, in comparison with the standard 3-pulse DPS protocol.
FIG. 3: Secure key rate as a function of channel length
for the asymptotic case.
C. Practical implementation
As described above, Alice and Bob can share a secure key using the setup in Fig. 2 . However, a practical implementation of the proposed scheme requires certain modifications to the set-up (see Fig. 4 ). Firstly, key generation requires detection of two time-synchronized photons by a single detector. In practice, this would be constrained by the finite dead-time of the single-photon detectors. Hence, an acousto-optic deflector (AOD) is used to route the photon in each time-instance to different single-photon detectors. This results in a slight modification to the key-reconciliation step, namely, Charles now announces which pair of detectors clicked in each time-instance.
Another challenge in the practical implementation of this scheme is the requirement of a common phase reference between Alice's and Bob's sources. This requirement arises because Alice and Bob use independent laser sources for generating their single-photon pulses. The optical phase-locked loop (OPLL) technique [47, 48] , commonly used in coherent detections, can be used to phase lock the sources used by Alice and Bob. The OPLL has a simple setup and requires only off-the-shelf components [49] .
IV. FINITE KEY ANAYSIS OF DPS-MDI-QKD
In order to analyse our protocol in the finite-key regime, we first map it to a protocol that involves shared entangled pairs between Alice and Bob. Such a mapping of a phase-encoded protocol to an entanglement-based protocol has been shown earlier [35] . Following a similar approach, we now show there exists an equivalent, entanglement-based protocol to our proposed DPS-MDI-QKD protocol.
A. An equivalent entanglement-based protocol
We first represent Alice's single-photon pulse in a linear superposition of three orthogonal states, as follows,
Here, a † k denotes the creation operator for the photon in the k th time-instance. Alice uses a quantum random number generator to generate a random 2-bit integer j, written in binary notation as (j 1 j 2 ) 2 . She encodes this random integer in the single-photon pulse, such that the encoded state is written as,
where
l=1 j l . Alice prepares and stores 2 qubits corresponding to each encoded block in her quantum memory, which are entangled with the encoded block as follows,
Bob also carries out a similar encoding procedure as Alice to get his own register of qubits entangled with his encoding blocks. Along the lines of Eqs. (12) and (13), Bob's state is written as,
wherej is the random 2-bit integer used by Bob to encode his single-photon pulse. Alice and Bob send their encoded states across to Charles. He first applies a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to find the number of photons in a given state and throws away the ones which have more than one photon in the same time-instance. He sends the rest through his beamsplitter. He then publicly announces the time instance (say k = 1, 2, 3), as well as the detector (D c or D d ) , at which the photon was detected. As explained in Table I in Sec. III, based upon Charles's measurement outcome, Alice and Bob use either ∆φ 1 or ∆φ 2 to extract the key.
When their shared key is established using ∆φ i , Alice and Bob retain their corresponding ancilla qubits (A i and B i , respectively) and discard the other ancilla qubit. As shown in Appendix B, for those time-instances when they do not need to carry-out a bit flip operation, they share a perfectly correlated entangled state
On the other hand, corresponding to those time-instances when they execute a bit-flip to extract the shared key, they share the anticorrelated Bell state
tailed discussion of the joint state after Charles' measurement and key-reconciliation can be found in Appendix B.
FIG. 4: Practical implementation of DPS-MDI-QKD.

B. Finite key analysis
Finiteness of key size constitutes a major chink in the security proofs of practical QKD protocols. Most of the theoretical proofs provide a bound on the secure key rate by assuming the key size as infinite. However, practical implementations cannot run forever. This gap in theory and practice is bridged by providing security bounds for the finite number of signal exchanges between Alice and Bob.
A perfect key is a uniformly distributed bit string, having no dependence on adversary's knowledge. Practical keys deviate from this ideal scenario, and this deviation is captured by a parameter ε, interpreted as the maximum probability of a practical key differing from a completely random bit string. Following [50, 51] , we say that a key K is ε-secure with respect to an eavesdropper E if,
Here, ρ KE is the joint state of the 'key system' K and the adversary E, and τ K is the completely mixed state on K.
In the asymptotic case, for any QKD protocol involving Alice and Bob sharing entangled pairs, under the assumption of collective attacks, the secure key rate (R) can be bounded as [1, 3, 52] ,
Here X and Y represent Alice and Bob's key systems respectively, E represents the eavesdropper, and H(. | .) is the conditional von Neumann entropy. Intuitively, Eq. (16) follows from the fact that the secure key rate is equal to Eve's uncertainty about the raw key X minus Bob's uncertainty. For our DPS-MDI protocol, the conditional entropy H(X | E) can be expressed as [53] ,
where e b is the bit error rate. We follow the finite-key analysis presented in [53, 54] , involving a generalization of von Neumann entropy, called the smooth entropy. The objective of this smoothening of the regular entropic functions is to take into account the fluctuations arising from the finite signal size. As in the asymptotic case, Alice and Bob are assumed to share entangled pairs, which holds for our proposed scheme, as outlined in Sec. IV A above. The generalized form of Eq. (16) in the finite-key regime can be expressed as [54] ,
where H ξ (X | E) is the conditional smooth-min entropy, leak EC is the number of bits needed to be shared over a classical channel for error correction and ∆ is as shown below, Here, ε EC is the error probability, defined as the probability that Bob ends up with a wrong bit string after the error correction stage.ε andε are the smoothening parameters as mentioned in Lemma 2 of [54] .
We calculate H ξ (X | E) for our protocol using the asymptotic value of H(X | E). In the finite-key regime Eq. (17) translates to,
where ξ is a non-negative parameter (Lemma 3 of [54] given by,
The bit error rate in finite-key regime is expressed as e b = e b +ξ(m, d = 2), where m is the number of bits used in parameter estimation and d is the number of possible POVM outcomes. Using Eqs. (19) , (20) , and (21) we may estimate the sifted key rate as described in Eq. (18) . The performance of a practical error correcting code as analyzed in [54] gives leak EC /n = 1.2h(Q), where, Q is the quantum bit error rate (QBER). This helps in estimating the second term of Eq. (18) . (N, ε, leak EC , ε EC ) are protocol dependent parameters, whereas n, m,ε and ε are selected so as to maximize the key rate per signal (r = (n/N )r ) under the constraints n + m ≤ N and ε − ε EC >ε >ε ≥ 0. Fig. 5 shows the variation of key rate with the number of exchanged signals for the proposed protocol. We have used ε = 10 −5 , ε EC = 10 −10 for generating the plots for different values of Q. The key rate per signal (r) tends to the sifted key rate of 4 9 in the asymptotic limit, as expected. This is a reflection of the fact that only 4 9 of the raw key bits can be used for key generation and rest is used for parameter estimation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a 3-path superposition based DPS-MDI-QKD protocol. We have shown the necessity and advantages of having the 3-path superposition. The proposed protocol is mapped to an entanglement-based protocol. This allows us to carry out the finite-key analysis of the protocol. We further simulated the variation in key rate with the number of exchanged signals of our protocol. One interesting question that arose during this work was regarding finite-key analysis of 3-path DPS-MDI using weak coherent source. Another interesting problem that can be addressed in the future works is tightening of the bounds used in the finite-key analysis of the proposed protocol.
We start with the form of the input to Charles' beamsplitter given in Eq. (3):
t3 ]. We leave out the states that correspond to photons traversing identical paths in Alice and Bob's set-ups, since they do not contribute to the sifted key, and consider the (normalized) state,
Setting φ a1 − φ b1 = ∆φ 1 and φ a1 − φ b1 = ∆φ 1 to be the phase differences between corresponding pulses from Alice and Bob, the input to Charles' beamsplitter can be written as,
Fig . 6 shows a typical 50 : 50 beamsplitter. The beamsplitter acts on the input states as shown below,
Here, c and d are the output modes and a and b are the input modes. Applying the beamsplitter transformation to Eq. (A2), we get
The output can be further simplified as,
+ e i∆φ2 |0 (c) 0
